Relational quality: A dynamic framework for assessing the role of trust in strategic alliances by Ariño, Africa et al.
University of Navarra
RELATIONAL QUALITY: A DYNAMIC
FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE ROLE
OF TRUST IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Africa Ariño*
José de la Torre**
Peter Smith Ring***
RESEARCH PAPER No 389
April, 1999
*  Professor of General Management, IESE
** Professor, The Anderson School at UCLA





08034 Barcelona - Spain
Copyright © 1999, IESE
Do not quote or reproduce without permission
IESERELATIONAL QUALITY: A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING
THE ROLE OF TRUST IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Abstract
The organizational literature has always posited that “trust” plays a key role in
economic exchanges, particularly when one or another party is subject to the risk of
opportunistic behavior, incomplete monitoring, or when moral hazard problems arise. These
conditions are almost always present in the case of alliances and joint ventures between
independent parties. This paper explores the concept of “relational quality” in one such inter-
organizational form — dyadic alliances — where past experience and the shadow of the
future play an important role.  Relational quality is important, as it affects the extent to which
partners substitute reliance on trust for more formal control mechanisms. Building on theory,
case studies and survey data, we develop a framework for thinking about trust in dynamic
and practical terms. We define three elements affecting relational quality in alliances: the
initial conditions surrounding the exchange, the cumulative experiences of the parties with
each other’s behaviors as they interact, and the impact that external events have on
perceptions of behavior and attitudes of the parties about each other’s trustworthiness. We use
data on a sample of alliances with one Spanish partner to explore the relative impact of these
elements and develop a more precise set of propositions from this framework. The paper
should guide further work towards quantifying the role of trust as a control mechanism in the
performance of strategic alliances.RELATIONAL QUALITY: A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING
THE ROLE OF TRUST IN STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
Judging by recent special issues of Organization Science (1998), the Academy of
Management Review (1998) and the Academy of Management Journal (1995 and 1997), as
well as the French journal Economies et Sociétés; Sciences et Gestion (1998), discussions of
issues related to inter-organizational collaboration and trust currently dominate much of the
management literature. The five volumes just mentioned are being followed by this issue of
Organization Studies on trust, and a special issue of the Strategic Management Journal on
strategic networks.  These comprehensive collections of conceptual and empirical research on
these two topics build on an impressive foundation of economic and behavioral studies laid
during the last ten years (1). Furthermore, the international business literature goes back even
further in its examination of the role and durability of joint venture structures (2). 
Nonetheless, as Koza and Lewin (1998:261) have observed: “It is clear that research
on trust needs to advance beyond a catch-all residual in the unexplained random error.” This
paper heeds their call for “systemic research on the role of trust in alliances.” We begin by
defining strategic alliances and explaining the reasoning behind our focus on this form of
inter-organizational collaboration. This is followed by a very brief discussion of the role of
alliances in modern business contexts (the literature just cited provides a more
comprehensive treatment). Next, we explore briefly the research on trust, setting the stage for
a discussion of our construct of “relational quality.” The following section tests these
concepts in an exploratory manner with a sample of alliances in which at least one partner is
a Spanish company.  The paper concludes with a series of propositions regarding the role of
trust in inter-organizational alliances, a discussion of issues related to its operationalization,
and suggestions for further research.
(1) The list is long, but a reasonable collection should include at least the following: Gambetta (1988); Gray
(1989); Gerlach (1992); Larsen (1992); Nohria and Eccles (1992); Ring and Van de Ven (1992); Sako
(1992); Alter and Hage (1993); Bleeke and Ernst (1993); Grabher (1993); Sitkin and Roth (1993); Zajac
and Olsen (1993); Barney and Hansen (1994); Ring and Van de Ven (1994); Gulati (1995); Grandori and
Soda (1995); Häkansson and Snehota (1995); Hosmer (1995); Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995); Zaheer
and Venkatraman (1995); Doz (1996); Gomes-Casseres (1996); Kramer and Tyler (1996); Lane and
Bachmann (1996); Ring (1996a); Ring (1996b); Uzzi (1996); Ariño (1997); Bidault (1997); Ebers (1997);
Ring (1997b); Uzzi (1997); Doz and Hamel (1998); and Gulati (1998).
(2) Among the principal studies are Franko (1971); Berg, Duncan and Friedman (1982); Hladik (1985);
Harrigan (1986); Contractor and Lorange (1988); Beamish and Killing (1997).Definitions of alliances and trust
Collaborative structures as a choice for the exploitation of business opportunities
have been reported as rising dramatically as the twin impacts of globalization and
technological complexity combine to challenge any organization’s capability to maintain
competitive advantage on the strength of its own resources (3). The literature on inter-
organizational collaboration is rich in definitions of alliances, but less so in what makes them
strategic. Doz and Hamel (1998) as well as Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (1998) have
identified a number of reasons why firms appear to be relying more heavily on strategic
alliances. Ring, Hoskisson and Lorenzoni (forthcoming) categorize the motivations of
alliance partners in terms of strategic and managerial logics. Koza and Lewin (1998), relying
on March (1991, 1995), suggest that alliances can be classified either as exploitative
(performance oriented) or explorative (learning oriented).
Here, we define an alliance as a formal agreement between two or more business
organizations to pursue a set of private and common interests (Ariño, 1995) through the
sharing of resources (physical assets, intellectual properties, people, capital, and/or
organizational capabilities) in contexts involving contested markets and uncertainty over
outcomes. An alliance is strategic when it is the means by which a firm seeks to implement,
in part or in whole, elements of management’s strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989)
(4). Whereas alliances may be governed by many forms — equity joint ventures, non-equity
collaborative arrangements, licensing or franchising agreements, management contracts, and
long-term supply contracts, among others (see Yoshino and Rangan, 1995, for a fuller
treatment of all options) — and may involve either dyads, consortia or networked
organizations (Ring, 1996a), the developmental objectives of our research lead us to focus on
dyads (5). 
What do we mean by trust in this paper? First, we believe that trust is a function of risk
and interdependence (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Koza and Lewin, 1998; Sheppard and
Sherman, 1998). Trust does not involve faith, nor is it particularly relevant in contexts involving
certainty (Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988). Second, our framework assumes that in business
the issue is not whether some people are more or less predisposed to trust other people, nor
whether people are “trustworthy.” Third, as Koza and Lewin (1998) have pointed out, economic
actors are no more likely to "suspend self-interest" in alliances than in other contexts. Our focus
is on whether people, and more importantly firms, rely on trust as a control mechanism in their
business dealings as a substitute for other governance structures, processes and principles
(Dore, 1983; Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Moreover, reliance on trust may produce the same
results in terms of efficiency and effectiveness as reliance on more contractual governance
provisions (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992, 1994; Ariño and de la Torre, 1998).
The literature on trust suggests that the term can be subjected to many adjectives.  For
example, Sako (1992) identifies three dimensions to trust, tied respectively to contractual
(ethical), competence (technical) and attitude (goodwill) considerations. Barney and Hansen
(1994) discuss weak, semi-strong and strong forms of trust, whereas Ring (1996b) describes
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(3) One consulting organization focusing on the management and performance of strategic alliances, Booz-
Allen & Hamilton, reports a data base of more than 20,000 such structures formed worldwide since 1995
(Harbison and Pekar, 1998).
(4) A type of alliance considered not strategic would be, for example, those oriented towards divesting or
harvesting a business (see Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989).
(5) Although it is an empirical issue, we believe that the nature of relational quality in network contexts is
likely to be more complex than our formulation allows for dyadic situations.fragile and resilient trust.  Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998) categorize trust as being
based on either deterrence, calculus, relations or institutions. These definitions, as well as
others, cut across a number of levels and units of analysis.  As will become clear, our view of
trust is generally compatible with arguments made by Sheppard and Sherman (1998:427) that
trust is “a manageable act of faith in people, relationships and social institutions” (emphasis
added). We argue, however, that reliance on trust is a somewhat more probabilistic decision
than a simple act of faith.  Our framework is designed to make it easier for managers or
researchers to consider both interdependence and risk in their decisions to rely on trust as a
mechanism for governance, as well as to make explicit the implications of the multi-
dimensionality of trust.  Thus, consistent with arguments made by Rousseau et. al. (1998) and
House, Rousseau and Thomas-Hunt (1995), we will explore trust at the meso level of analysis.
Theoretical foundations
Macneil (1974) describes economic exchanges as being of two types: transactional
and relational.  Transactional exchanges are characterized as those which involve relatively
discrete exchanges of goods or services in which the parties act with little or no regard for the
impact the transaction (or their behavior in it) might have on future exchanges. The parties
view themselves as independent, autonomous economic actors, and they view the transaction
as being unrelated to all other exchanges, past, present, or future. In Macneil’s terms, the
transaction is “sharp in-sharp out.” 
In contrast, relational exchanges assume that the parties have a past (one that is known
and remembered), and may be associated with each other in the future. Any previous
associations are likely to be relevant to the decision to undertake the current exchange; and the
parties will conduct themselves with an eye to the future. In short, past experiences and
the shadow of the future (Axelrod, 1984) are important factors in shaping the way parties
conduct themselves in relational exchanges.  Further, relational embeddedness influences not
only whether the particular exchange is undertaken, but also the extent to which the parties will
substitute trust for formal control in the exchange. This will depend on the strength of the
relationship, which “is a property not of the transactors but of their concrete relations”
(Granovetter, 1985:491). Reliance on trust, we therefore argue, depends on relational quality,
itself conditioned by past experiences and the shadow of the future (Ariño and de la Torre, 1998).
The concept of relational quality explored in this paper is composed of three
elements.  First, it will be important to consider the circumstances related to:
1) the prior experiences of the parties with each other (they may be “familiar” or
“unfamiliar” [Bigley and Pearce, 1998] with each other);
2) what each knows about the other through third party gossip (Burt and Knez,
1995) and/or reputation (Hill, 1990; Barney and Hansen, 1994);
3) what may be inferred from the parties’ institutional affiliations or demographic
characteristics (Coleman, 1984; Granovetter, 1985; Zucker, 1986), or the
institutions that may impact the relationship as it evolves (Lewis and Weigert,
1985; Shapiro, 1987; Lane and Bachmann, 1996); and
4) the mutual confidence built through the negotiation process prior to the
commencement of operations (Gray, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994;
Browning et. al., 1995).
3Second, we posit that the experience of the parties with each other’s behavior as the
exchange unfolds, particularly under conditions of stress caused by environmental change or
other similar challenges, will influence the parties’ views of each other’s trustworthiness
(Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; McKnight, Cummings and Chervany, 1998), and is a critical
determinant of relational quality.  Finally, we argue that external events that do not directly
affect the exchange relationship nonetheless will impact the perceptions and attitudes of the
parties regarding each other’s trustworthiness (Khanna, 1998) and must be taken into
consideration.
We believe that this approach provides a more dynamic and measurable way of
conceptualizing the role that trust may play in economic exchanges relative to more
conventional or limited treatments of trust (6). 
Initial conditions
Meyerson, Weick and Kramer (1996:167) describe “traditional” sources of trust as:
“familiarity, shared experience, reciprocal disclosure, threats and deterrents, fulfilled
promises, and demonstrations of non-exploitation of vulnerability.”  Similarly, Zucker (1986)
defines trust as a set of shared expectations “taken for granted” as part of a “world known in
common” among certain members of society.  She relates these expectations to three sources,
two of which — person-based and institution-based — derive their legitimacy from
characteristics inherent to the individuals (e.g., similar culture or family background) or the
institutions (e.g., professional or corporate affiliation) involved in the transaction.  Zucker’s
third source of trust — process-based — relates to a history of past experiences more in line
with our concept of reputation effects, as described above.  In this sense, national differences
in values, social context and institutions could be expected to have a significant impact on
trust formation and the rate of change in relational quality (Dore, 1983; Fukujama, 1995;
Doney, Cannon and Mullen, 1998; Hagen and Choe, 1998).  Thus, we argue that each partner
approaches the negotiation process with a set of a priori expectations of the standards of
behavior the other party will hold to, and the probability that it will abide by those standards.
Figures 1a-1c present some preliminary and merely illustrative classifications of both the
level of “community standards” one might expect from these actors, and the variance one
might observe in their behavior.
Figure 1a. Baseline expectations of trustworthiness: hypothetical country effects
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(6) For similar arguments see Gulati (1995); Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995); and Noteboom, Berger and
Nooderhaven (1997).Figure 1b. Baseline expectations of trustworthiness:
Hypothetical Industry/Profession effects
Figure 1c. Baseline expectations of trustworthiness:
Hypothetical Corporate Effects - Autos and electronics
Note: For one approach at such rankings see Fortune, October 26, 1998.
We believe further that the negotiating process leading to the creation of a strategic
alliance will either cement or distort the initial assessments of trustworthiness derived from
such generic sources. Prejudices and tolerances present in ego’s initial judgement of alter will
be confirmed or questioned by this experience, thus modifying the so-called starting
conditions. Doz (1996), for example, defines these initial conditions as including a number of
critical elements of a collaborative relationship — task definition, partners’ routines,






Trendy restaurants  Pizza parlors
Investment banking  Law Offices
Orthopedic surgeon  User car lots
Architectural firm  Cosmetic surgeon
 Hollywood  agents
Michelin 3-star restaurant  Fast food restaurants
Public accountants  Airport hotels
Medical equipment supplier  Post office
International courier services  Social Security Administration
 High  Low





Jaguar General  Motors




Mercedes Benz  SEAT
Lexus  Yugo
BMW  Hyundai
Hewlett-Packard  Private Label Electronics
Bose
 High  Low
  Community StandardsThere are sound reasons for differentiating the nature of collaborative efforts among
business firms (Kanter, 1994; Powell, 1996). Powell describes four generic types: networks of
place, R&D networks, business groups (e.g., keiretsu, chaebol), and those that he describes as
strategic alliances and collaborative manufacturing arrangements. They all “illustrate different
pathways to cooperation” (Powell, 1996:62). Thus, we may expect that the weight accorded to
the different components constituting initial conditions will vary significantly between these
types of collaborative arrangements, and perhaps to a lesser degree within them. We also expect
that the parties’ interactions over time will differentially affect the constituent components of
relational quality. Whether these changes are the result of the parties’ measuring each other’s
performance against specific expectations formed during initial conditions, or whether they are
due to a more generic change in the overall degree of trust developed between the parties, is a
more complex issue that we do not explore in this paper.
Partner Interaction
Meyerson, Weick and Kramer (1996) argue that trust plays a critical role in
managing issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk and expectations that surface in economic
exchanges. Managers make decisions regarding these four issues in the course of defining the
initial conditions of their exchange relationship.  But all these issues will be subjected to
review as the collaboration process evolves.
We approach the problem in Bayesian terms. Figure 2 illustrates one conception of
the meaning of trust: the belief that the other party will subordinate their own interests to the
interests of the alliance, within most expected environmental contexts. The y-axis in the
diagram represents the probability the focal firm assigns to the fidelity of the partner’s
actions in the face of incentives to cheat or act opportunistically.  The potential payoffs to the
partner associated with deviation from the committed path are illustrated along the x-axis,
which describes the degree to which different states of nature diverge from forecasted
contingencies. Within “expected” tolerances, and even beyond these, a sense of
trustworthiness implies an expectation of fair behavior even when circumstances would call
for opportunism.  Only under severe conditions, or force majeure, might the aggrieved party
tolerate selfish behavior from its partner, but then only if appropriately warned of the
impending action and if convinced that the conditions made any other action impossible.
Figure 2. Hypothetical Bayesian distributions of various forms of trust
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Opportunity Cost to Partner of Holding True to the Agreement Under Different Contingencies


























ExperienceAn interesting debate on the degree to which  a partner’s obligation under a
“gentlemen’s agreement” might allow room for interpretation under exceptional circumstances
can be traced to the English philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries.  Locke noted in his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1692) that there were three answers to the question
as to “why should a man keep his word.”  The first two were rooted in the command of the law,
whether of divine or human provenance, whereas the third answer, harking back to the old
Greek philosophers, would be: “Because it was dishonest, below the dignity of man, and
opposite to virtue, the highest perfection of human nature, to do otherwise.”  In this discussion,
Locke introduces us to two central issues in our interpretation of the qualities of trust.  One is
the motivation for keeping one’s word where the competing hypotheses are fidelity for fear of
retribution and punishment (from either a stern God or the Leviathan) versus a sense of moral
obligation bound by conscience. The second issue deals with the rationale for any deviation
from one’s moral commitment. Both God’s law and the State recognize the concept of force
majeure, even though fundamentalist interpretations of the law would limit considerably any
scope for relativism (7). Traditionalists, among them David Hume in his notorious debate with
Thomas Reid, argued for the absolute quality of a man’s word, regardless of circumstance or
consequence, a view represented by the flat line in Figure 2 (8). In any event, under either
conception of trust, the interaction between the partners begins with some prior assessment of
their fidelity and reliability under most contingencies.
Powell (1996:63) argues that “trust is neither chosen nor embedded but is instead
learned and reinforced, hence a product of ongoing interaction and discussion.” These
learning processes constitute an important element of partner interaction; the second element
in our construct of relational quality.  We believe that the sort of processes that facilitate this
learning approximate informal processes described by  Ring and Rands (1989) and Ring and
Van de Ven (1994): sense-making, understanding and committing. Following Doz (1996), we
argue that ego will focus on five aspects of collaboration: environmental conditions, task
definition and performance, creation and management of collaborative processes, partners’
skills, and the changing nature of the goals and motives of alter. The nature and the extent of
alter meeting ego’s expectations about its performance in relation to these aspects will affect
the degree of trust that exists between the partners over the course of the collaboration’s
evolution. A willingness to adjust expectations in the face of changing conditions is likely to
be an important factor in how trustworthy each views the other as being.
Thus, returning to Figure 2, the experience of the partners in dealing with adversity or
changed conditions (both external or internal to the venture) will allow ego to modify its
probability distribution on alter acting contrary to ego’s expectations. Furthermore, as
demonstrated in Ariño and de la Torre (1998), these interactions will also affect the quality of
the relationship between the partners. They will either become more tolerant of small deviations
from plan as their relationship improves, or will increase their suspicions of duplicity and
undertake unilateral actions that may worsen the relationship even further. Our sense here is of
a constantly evolving relationship where tests of loyalty and fidelity occur periodically and with
different severity and transparency. The partners constantly adjust to this new state of affairs,
either by resolving conflicts and consolidating their relationship, or by withholding resources
unilaterally and dooming the alliance to failure in the long run.
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(7) An example of an extreme interpretation of one’s obligation to a covenant of obeisance would be God’s
command to Abraham to sacrifice his son Izaak, requiring a breach of trust in one of the most sacred human
relationships, that of a father with his child. Abraham does not invoke force majeure as a rationale for not
obeying God, and is prepared to commit this act of allegiance regardless of the consequences until such
time as he is relieved of the obligation.
(8) We are indebted to Ahmet Aykaç and Charles Wisemann at Theseus Institute for introducing us to this
debate and some of the concepts elaborated here.External Events
Regardless of the trials to which the relationship is exposed as part of its normal
evolution, there may occur a number of unrelated external events which, nonetheless, have an
impact on the partners’ perceptions of each other’s trustworthiness.  These are likely to be of
three types:
1) Systemic, such as environmental changes that affect all parties simultaneously
and equally, e.g., the Asian crisis in 1997-98 and its impact on a Korean
partner’s ability to maintain its word or posture in a specific relationship.
2) Corporate, wherein one of the partners is involved in matters that affect its
reputation for fair dealing in other circumstances or with other partners.
Examples may include an anti-trust suit for non-compliance (Microsoft), a
discriminatory legal action (Texaco or Mitsubishi Motors), patent violations
(3M and Kodak), environmental issues (the Exxon Valdez), product safety or
liability (Ford Pinto or Perrier), etc.
3) Individual, where one or more individuals who are directly involved in the
partner-interface are involved in matters that affect either their own or their
firm’s reputation for fair dealing in circumstances foreign to the relationship.
Examples could include a personal conflict of interest claim, a nasty divorce,
an allegation of insider trading, etc.
It should be pointed out that all of these categories may also have positive impacts.
For example, Jim Burke’s prompt action as head of Johnson & Johnson following the Tylenol
contamination problem elevated his own and his firm’s reputation for integrity under
adversity.  Similarly, winning a prestigious award, such as a Baldridge Quality Award, might
serve as a positive signal to actual or potential partners.
Burt and Knez (1995) describe a phenomenon related to reliance on trust in
networks as “third-party gossip.”  This involves information about one partner that comes to
the other’s attention.  They argue that third party gossip amplifies both the positive and the
negative in a relationship, and provide evidence that different sources of third party gossip
will have differential effects on the trustworthiness associated with the focus of the gossip.
Methods
We begin with a description of our sample, and then define the measures employed
and present our results.  Given the exploratory nature of this research project, we relied on
data available to us from a study previously conducted by one of the authors (Ariño, 1995).
Sample
The sample for this study was drawn from Spanish firms that appeared in Funk and
Scott’s  Countries Index - Europe (1986-1992) as having announced their engagement in
venturing activities, beginning with Spain’s accession to the European Community (1986)
and concluding with the establishment of the Single European Market (1992). This is a
period that can be expected, a priori, to include high venturing activity, especially if we take
8into account that the international exposure of Spanish firms was low at that time.  Target
industries included those with a higher number of collaborative ventures (see Table 1).
Table 1. Industry groups and response rate for sample
The target informant in each firm was the person most directly related to the
alliance.  Of the 189 mailed questionnaires, 91 (48%) were returned.  We attribute this rather
high response rate to the care taken in identifying the target respondent and in the follow-up
process (Dillman, 1978).  More than 63% of the informants had personally participated in the
negotiation of their firm’s alliance, and on average they had been involved with the alliance
for 4.9 years (9). 
Measures
Our operationalized measures were initially constructed by each of two authors
independently reviewing instrument items and identifying those that each thought reflected
relevant aspects of relational quality.  After these two had resolved differences of opinion, the
third author reviewed the proposed constructs and suggested further changes.
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Questionnaires % of  No. of  % of 
Industry Group mailed total mailed responses responses
Energy (Petroleum and Electricity) 19 10.1 6 6.6
Chemicals 15 7.9 14 15.4
Machinery Except Electrical 7 3.7 5 5.5
Electronic Equipment 7 3.7 4 4.4
Transportation Equipment 5 2.6 4 4.4
Transportation 8 4.2 6 6.6
Communications 2 1.1 0 0.0
Financial Services 95 50.3 37 40.6
Other Services 31 16.4 15 16.5
TOTAL 189 100.0 91 100.0
(9) See Ariño (1995) for more detail in terms of sampling methods, a description of the questionnaire and other
methodological information. For the purpose of this study, 20 of the returned questionnaires were
incomplete. In four cases, we received answers from both sides of the alliance. To insure independent data
points we dropped out one of the parties, selecting it randomly by the flip of a coin.  This left a final sample
of 67 questionnaires for this study. A full description of the questionnaire items is available from the author.Independent variable
As discussed before, relational quality is both an input to and an output of the
collaboration process.  A high level of relational quality implies that ego is satisfied with its
relationship with alter (and vice versa).  Ego (and alter) perceives that it is getting what it
wanted individually — its private goals — in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and
adaptiveness, and also what both wanted collectively — their common goals — and that
alter’s behavior is consistent with ego’s expectations (and vice versa). Therefore, as a
measure of relational quality we use a five-point scale measuring the informants’ assessment
of the extent to which their firm is satisfied with the overall performance of the alliance. This
traditional measure of overall performance satisfaction captures the fact that the alliance
outcome also includes ego’s assessment of the relationship based on alter’s behavior (Ariño
and de la Torre, 1998).
Dependent variables
Initial Conditions. Ego will be willing to engage in a relationship with alter
(assuming, of course, that the business and economic logic of the proposed venture stands up
to scrutiny) to the extent that initial conditions make it reasonable for ego to expect that alter
will execute its commitments under the proposed arrangement (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).
For example, alter should do so to the extent that interest-aligning mechanisms exist. Taking
a mutual hostage position by investing in assets that are highly specific to the venture
(Williamson, 1985; Parkhe, 1993) may serve as such a mechanism. Alternatively, alter may
live up to its commitments in fulfillment of a social expectation to do so (Gouldner, 1959;
Ouchi, 1980). The consequences to one’s reputation of not fulfilling these expectations may
be greater in a domestic context than in an international one (Gerlach, 1992). Thus, there may
be differences in the risk profile for non-compliance between a firm transacting with a
domestic partner and one venturing with a foreign partner. Furthermore, knowledge about
alter’s likely behavior is bound to be better when ego has had prior relationships with alter
than if not. In consideration of these factors, we employ the following measures of initial
conditions:
1) “Differential Asset-Specificity” is the difference between the firm’s and the
partner’s asset specificity. The firm’s asset specificity is a two-item scale
measuring the informants’ assessment of their firm’s level of investment in
assets specific to the venture (á=0.75). Similarly, the partner’s asset specificity
is a two-item scale measuring the informants’ assessment of their partner’s
level of investment in assets specific to the venture (á=0.70).
2) “European Partner” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the partner was a firm
from a country in the EU other than Spain, and 0 otherwise.
3) “Other Country Partner” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the partner was a
firm from a country outside the EU, and 0 otherwise. In this way, the ventures
in which the partner is another Spanish company act as a reference for the
behavior of these two variables.
4) “Prior Relationships” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm had prior
relationships with the partner, and 0 otherwise.
Partner Interaction. As the venture unfolds, ego and alter interact and gain
experience with each other, observing the opposite’s behavior under varying circumstances.
10Based on these experiences and observations, ego evaluates whether alter’s behavior is
consistent with ego’s expectations, and compares it to ego’s own behavior. Cumulatively,
these experiences refine ego’s assessments of alter’s “fidelity” (as defined in Figure 2), and
determine the level of relational quality in their exchanges.  Our measures of partner
interaction include:
5) “Differential Relational Investment” is the difference between the focal firm’s
and the partner’s adjustment effort or mutual orientation (Madhok & Tallman,
1998). The focal firm’s adjustment effort is a two-item scale measuring the
informants’ assessment of their firm’s effort to adjust to the partner’s style
(á=0.80). The partner’s adjustment effort is a two-item scale measuring the
informants’ assessment of their partner’s effort in adapting to their style
(á=0.76).
6) “Information Exchange” is a three-item scale measuring the informants’
assessment of the degree to which their firm discloses information that may
facilitate the activities of the alliance’s management team (á=0.69).
7) “Differential Cooperative Behavior” is the difference between the focal firm’s
and the partner’s level of cooperative behavior. The firm’s level of cooperative
behavior is an 11-item scale measuring the informants’ assessment of the
extent to which their firm adapts its behavior to the partner’s needs (á=0.74).
The partner’s level of cooperative behavior is an 11-item scale measuring the
informants’ assessment of the extent to which their partner adapts its behavior
to the needs of their firm (á=0.85).
External Events. Information regarding alter’s behavior in other contexts may
influence ego’s expectations about the consistency of this behavior with ego’s expectations
from alter.  Within the constraints of the data available to us, and in the absence of direct
information on what companies have heard about their partners from third parties, we used as
a proxy the influence that the partner’s behavior today may have on its possibilities to form
other ventures in the future. This acts as a shadow of the future on today’s behavior.
8) “Third Party Gossip” is a scale measuring the informants’ assessment of the
importance reputation—that is, the way in which their partner manages the
relationship—may have on the partner’s possibilities of setting up future
alliances (10). 
Control Variables. The quality of a relationship may be affected by changes
exogenous to the alliance that alter the context in which it is embedded, particulary in so far
as they impact either the efficiency or the effectiveness of the relationship as a means to
achieve the parties’ intent. These may include changes in the environment, as well as changes
in the strategy of either party (Ariño and de la Torre, 1998), which may also affect the ability
of the parties to adapt, another important measure of success in alliances (Doz, 1996). Thus,
we need to control for them.
9) “Environmental Change” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there were
changes in environmental context that substantially affected the alliance, and 0
otherwise.
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(10)This measure is not ideal for testing the nature of third-party gossip or its sources. However, the exploratory
nature of this research and the constraints imposed by the available data set suggested this compromise.
Our discussion of implications takes this into consideration.10) “Strategic Change” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there were changes in
the strategy of the focal firm or its partner that substantially affected the
venture, and 0 otherwise.
Results
Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations and correlation matrix of the
independent variables. Table 3 contains the results of the regression analyses exploring our
four models of relational quality. These include a model with only initial conditions, one
testing for partner interaction, another including the influence of external events, and a fourth
model integrating all variables.
Table 2. Correlation of independent variables
Table 3. Regression results on relational quality
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INITIAL PARTNER EXTERNAL
VARIABLES CONDITIONS INTERACTION EVENTS INTEGRATED
MODEL MODEL MODEL MODEL
INITIAL CONDITIONS
Differential asset specificity .10 .19 **
European partner -.08 -.10
Other country partner .28 .55 **
Prior relationships .40 .33 *
PARTNER INTERACTION
Differential relational investment -.09 -.26 *
Information exchange .68 **** .65 ****
Differential cooperative behavior -.85 **** -.92 ****
EXTERNAL EVENTS
Third party gossip .38 *** .18 *
CONTROLS
Environmental changes .52 .43 * .75 ** .29
Strategic changes -.62 ** -.78 *** -.70 ** -.54 **
R2 .182 .483 .236 .618
Adjusted R2 .101 0,44 .199 .55
F 2.23 * 11.38 **** 6.47 **** 9.06 ****
n = 67
Significance levels:
      * = p < .10
    ** =  p < .05
  *** = p < .01
**** = p < .001
Means S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Asset Specif. 0.43 1.27 1
2. Euro. Partner 0.48 0.50 –0.04 1
3. Other Partner 0.21 0.41 –0.03 –0.49 1
4. Prior Relation 0.36 0.48 –0.19 –0.15 0.08 1
5. Diff. Relat. Inv. 0.18 0.59 0.10 –0.11 0.25 –0.02 1
6. Info. exchange 3.58 0.79 0.10 0.05 –0.01 –0.04 0.01 1
7. Diff. Coop Beh. 0.31 0.45 0.25 –0.07 0.17 –0.09 –0.01 0.11 1
8. 3rd. Party Gossip 3.08 0.91 –0.11 –0.08 0.00 0.15 0.09 0.08 –0.35 1
9. Environ. Change 0.21 0.41 0.26 –0.05 0.01 –0.08 0.00 0.18 0.04 –0.16 1
10. Strat. Change 0.27 0.45 –0.02 0.03 0.02 –0.31 0.02 0.11 0.09 –0.16 0.35 1The least-squares estimation for a model including initial conditions only was
marginally significant, and none of the initial conditions variables’ coefficients were significant.
The partner interaction model, however, was highly significant. Information exchange has a
positive and significant influence on relationship quality; the influence of differential
cooperative behavior is also significant, but negative. Differential relational investment has no
significant influence on relationship quality. This model explains a substantial amount of the
variation in relational quality (adjusted R2 = .44).  Finally, a model based on external events is
highly significant, as is the coefficient for the third party gossip variable, which exerts a positive
influence on relational quality.  As for the influence of the control variables, both environmental
and strategic changes appear to be significant in most cases. The environmental change
coefficient is positive, whereas that for strategic changes is negative.
The integrated model of relational quality is also highly significant.  In contrast to the
Initial Conditions Model, differential asset specificity, other country partner, and prior
relationships assume statistical significance (their signs remain positive), while European
partner remains insignificant (and negative). All of the partner interaction variables are
significant: information exchange is positive; the other two negative. The influence of third
party gossip remains significant and positive. As for the control variables, environmental
changes is not significant, while strategic changes remains significant and negative. It is worth
noting that the adjusted R2 of this model is substantial (0.55). However, it is about 25 percent
smaller than the sum of the adjusted R2 values of the three partial models. This indicates that
the variables are not totally independent, a point that we now explore in more detail.
Variance decomposition
To decompose the relational quality variance we started with the integrated model
and used F-tests to see if there were significant differences in the amount of explained
variance if we included one group of variables at a time. The analysis, illustrated in Figure 3,
starts at the bottom with the integrated model and then reports the significance of the F-test
between the integrated model and the three partial models, and then between these and the
null model with only the control variables in it.  





























p<0.05The combined effect of initial conditions, partner interaction, and third party gossip
is significant and explains an important amount of the observed variance in relational quality
in our sample. While partner interaction and external events have a significant influence on
relational quality by themselves, the contribution of initial conditions is not significant in
explaining the observed variance in relational quality. Partner interaction factors explain
more than twice as much variance as the external event factor, and the proportion is even
higher when compared to the initial conditions factors. Table 4 provides the incremental
contributions to R2 for each of the partial models. The models are not totally independent.
Additional analysis not reported here shows that most interdependence comes from the
association between partner interactions and external events, whereas the interdependence
between these two sets of factors and initial conditions is rather low.










The data from our sample of Spanish alliances support our contention that the role of
trust in economic exchanges can be appropriately thought of as a dynamic force, one that
appears to be composed of three distinct elements, each subject to different influences and
rates of formation and/or decay. Consistent with assertions made by McKnight, Cummings
and Chervany (1998), the results of our analysis of the integrated model of relational quality
suggest that a certain level of reliance on trust exists as a result of characteristics inherent in
the parties’ history and demographics. This “inherited” level of trust is then affected by the
processes the parties employ to negotiate their agreement. The outcome is a level of trust that
exists between the parties as they commence implementation of the alliance, what we call
“relational quality at initial conditions.”
Our approach to defining initial conditions included items that measured
institutional as well as process and personal bases of trust (Zucker, 1986).  For example, the
country of origin of an alliance may pre-dispose ego to trust alter more (or less) as it
contemplates a cooperative relationship with alter (11). The potential for opportunistic
behaviors asserted by transaction cost economists as being inherent in asset specificity also
appears to affect ego’s judgment about alter’s behavior. What ego thinks about the probability
of alter acting opportunistically is likely to be a function of institutional factors such as the
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(11)Evidence of national differences in predisposition towards trust can be found in UNESCO’s World Culture
Report (1998), pp. 279-80.efficacy of contract regimes (Lane and Bachmann, 1996) or other institutional guarantors
(Commons, 1924) such as warranties, bonds, courts, mediators, etc. (Shapiro, 1987).
Similarly,  positive behavioral outcomes of any prior relationships are likely to predispose
ego to view alter as being trustworthy.  Arrow (1973:24) asserts that “there is an element of
trust in every transaction.”  Although he does not discuss the emergence of trust in temporal
terms, the extant conceptual literature and recent empirical findings (e.g., Larson, 1992)
provide support for the assertion that all inter-organizational collaborations begin with an
initial reservoir of trust. We believe that this reservoir is nourished by streams from
institutional, process, and personal sources (Zucker, 1986). These sources of trust are found
in the conditions confronted by ego and alter before they begin formal processes involving
negotiation and commitment (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). They will affect the way they deal
with each other as they begin negotiations.
At this point in its dynamic evolution, we describe the trust that exists between ego
and alter as fragile (Ring, 1993). Ring (1996b:152) defines fragile trust as risk-based, where
“this risk is assumed to be a consequence of the threat of opportunistic behavior..”
Furthermore, “fragile trust is a type that permits economic actors to deal with each other, but
in guarded ways.”  The level of trust that exists at this point is a given.  Neither ego nor alter
is in a position to control the other’s perceptions; they are consequences of the kinds of
inherited conditions described above.
The parties can begin to exercise control over each other’s perceptions of them in
the course of sense-making and understanding that occurs during the negotiation and
transaction processes surrounding their deal making (Ring and Rands, 1989).  Assessing the
meaning of each other’s conduct in terms of trust in these informal processes is not
straightforward.  For example, ego make take a very hard line towards the formal processes,
pushing the firm’s interests at every turn.  Alter has to decide whether this means that ego is
not as trustworthy as might have been indicated by prior experiences, ego’s reputation, and/or
ego’s demographics (nationality, strategic group, etc.). Alternatively, ego could be very
accommodating towards alter’s requests during these processes. Does this mean that alter will
be able to rely on ego’s trustworthiness once an agreement has been reached?. Or, should
alter seek to control ego’s behavior by demanding agreement to a variety of endogenous
safeguards that serve to hedge its bet on ego’s trustworthiness during the initial stages of their
relationship?  Although re-negotiation is always possible, it may come too late to effectively
control opportunistic behaviors by either party.
If either ego or alter is inclined to use negotiation and transaction processes to
enhance perceptions of its trustworthiness, the level of trust that existed at the start of
negotiations will be a critical determinant. Low initial levels of trust are more difficult to
overcome, whereas high levels give the parties an incentive to build on them in the course of
reaching a deal. Collectively, this is likely to enhance the probability that the parties will
place greater reliance on trust than on other, more formal, control measures in the initial
stages of executive processes.  Based on the foregoing discussion, and the data in Table 3,
we offer the following propositions:
Proposition 1a: All negotiations in inter-organizational alliances begin with some
initial level of fragile trust between the parties.  
Proposition 1b:  Initial levels of fragile trust will be greatest when perceptions of the
trustworthiness of ego and alter have been positively conditioned by institutional,
process, and personal sources of trust.
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trustworthiness of ego and alter have been positively conditioned only by personal
and process sources of trust than when they are positively conditioned only by
institutional and process sources of trust.
Proposition 1d: Initial levels of fragile trust will be least when perceptions of
trustworthiness of ego and alter have been positively conditioned only by
institutional sources of trust.
Proposition 1e: All negotiations in inter-organizational alliances affect the initial
level of fragile trust that exists between the parties.
Proposition 1f: The greater the match between expectations and behavior of the
parties during negotiation processes in inter-organizational alliances, the higher the
level of fragile trust that exists as an initial condition of the relationship.
The reservoir of fragile-based trust that is derived from the initial condition
surrounding their relationship will be immediately affected by the nature of interactions
between the parties as they begin to implement their agreement (Gray, 1989; Zajac & Olsen,
1993; Browning et. al., 1995; Ring, 1997a; Ariño and de la Torre, 1998).  None of these
studies, however, provides direct insight into whether, or to what extent, these processes of
trust-building enhance a pre-existing level of trust between the parties.  In fact, most seem to
incorporate the impact of prior relationships, reputation effects, etc., into the very early stages
of the interactive processes outlined in their respective models.  In the model offered by
McKnight et al. (1998), on the other hand, it is not even clear when “initial formation” begins
or ends in process terms.
Our data also indicate that the contribution of partner interactions plays the key role
in assessments of the relational quality of an inter-organizational alliance. The willingness of
the parties to exchange information, as indicated in Table 3, has a strong influence on partner
interactions. Equally strong, but in negative terms, is the influence of differential cooperative
behavior. These results are entirely consistent with the literature on trust that suggests that the
willingness of the parties to share information with each other helps to build trust (Larson,
1992; Thomas and Trevino, 1993; Kanter, 1994). The influence of differential cooperative
behavior is also consistent with arguments made by economists employing tit-for-tat games
to explain cooperative behavior. The results on differential relational investment are
consistent with arguments offered by Macneil (1974), Heide and John (1992),  and Madhok
and Tallman (1998), among others, that levels of trust in inter-organizational alliances are
enhanced when the partners recognize that they need to engage in processes of mutual
adjustment if their collaborative efforts are to continue to evolve.  At times, however, reliance
on trust may be positively influenced by the unilateral actions of ego or alter (Gulati, Khanna
and Nohria, 1994).  Failure to respond to these kinds of unilateral commitments, or a failure
by alter to meet ego’s expectations about the need for mutual adjustment will have a negative
impact on relational quality to that point in time.
The results of the effect that the measures of partner interaction have on our
integrated model of relational quality leads us to offer the following propositions:
Proposition 2a: The nature of partner interactions during implementation phases of
an inter-organizational alliance will be the most significant factor in determining the
level of fragile trust experienced by ego and alter in their dealings with each other.
16Proposition 2b: The levels of fragile trust that are developed during initial conditions
will be adversely affected by a failure of the parties to seek to adapt to each other’s
needs and styles during the course of implementing the alliance.
Proposition 2c: The levels of fragile trust that are developed during initial conditions
will be positively affected by the willingness of ego and alter to disclose information
that enhances the efforts of the alliance’s management team.
The results of the data analysis outlined in Table 3 also indicate that external events
to an existing relationship can affect the partners’ perceptions of each other’s trustworthiness.
In a global business environment in which the actions of a firm or its employees are subjected
to scrutiny from a widening variety of stakeholders, the effects of “third-party” gossip on a
business relationship become even more important. The behaviors of both parties are subject
to constant monitoring by others with whom they also have relations, business or otherwise.
A breach of trust by either in the course of dealings with third parties may well be brought to
the other’s attention through reports from business associates, the press, or government
agencies. Third party gossip contributes in statistically significant ways to the relational
quality of an alliance, both on its own and in our integrated model. Based on these results, we
offer the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Levels of fragile trust between ego and alter will be affected in
significant ways by their behavior in relationships not directly tied to their alliance.
In addition, both theory and empirical results suggest that more generalized changes
in the external environment might also affect relational quality. As the data in Table 3
indicate, however, this does not appear to be the case for the integrated model. Such changes,
however, appear to have some impact on relational quality in the models in which we
explored the separate contributions of partner interaction and external events. What does
seem clear, however, is the fact that strategic changes by one or both of the parties will have
a significant impact on the relational quality of their exchange.  Not surprisingly, the impact
is greatest in the case of partner interactions.  Strategic changes by one or both of the parties
are likely to have a very direct impact on the goals for the alliance (Harrigan, 1986). Thus,
these changes may be appropriately viewed with suspicion until a clearer picture of the
motives behind the change emerges.
Assuming that the parties’ strategic objectives do not change in significant ways,
then the relational quality (RQ) that characterizes the relationship will be a function of the
level of trust engendered by the initial condition (IC) as it is cumulatively affected by partner
interactions (PI) and external events (XE). In contrast to the level of fragile trust that emerged
from initial conditions, the relational quality of the exchange at subsequent stages may have
significantly improved or weakened this level of fragile trust.  Whether this new level of trust
approaches a quality that Ring (1993, 1996b) describes as resilient is likely to be a function
of partner interactions producing results that exceed their expectations, provided external
events do not intervene in negative ways.  This leads us to our final proposition:
Proposition 4: An inter-organizational alliance characterized by a high degree of
relational quality may result in the transformation of fragile into resilient trust,
ceteris paribus.
A summary of our discussion of these exploratory data is outlined more formally in
the Appendix and in Figure 4.
17Figure 4. A dynamic model of relational quality in inter-organizational alliances: A reservoir of trust
Implications
The extant literature on trust tends to explore its dimensions from a static
perspective. Does trust exist? Is ego trustworthy? Does trust substitute for other control
mechanisms? These are frequently explored issues. Less well understood are answers to
questions such as does trust build more rapidly than distrust (Burt & Knez, 1995). Can one
form of trust become another, more resilient form of trust over time? Thus, our objective in
this paper has been to determine whether it is possible to offer a framework by which a more
dynamic view of trust in economic exchange might be explored. Theory, case studies, and
our survey data all provide support for such a framework and for the propositions we have
derived from the data.  Quite obviously much work remains, an issue to which we now turn.
We provide support for Doz’s (1996) contention that initial conditions are important
in establishing a basic level of trust between parties in an economic exchange. Our analysis
did not explore the impact of different initial conditions (e.g., how well the parties knew each
other, how many successful or unsuccessful transactions they had conducted with each other
in the past). Nonetheless, the results suggest that managers need to consider how their
conduct in one exchange will impact the perceptions of potential partners about their
trustworthiness. Conduct in any one relationship is something over which firms can exercise
a great deal of control. Knowing that their behavior casts a long shadow into the future also
means that the parties must work to project appropriate perceptions to third parties about the
meaning of their behavior.
Our findings on the contributions of initial conditions to relational quality also mean
that economic actors may be able to rely more heavily on trust in the conduct of their
negotiations. Ring (1997b) offers support for the proposition that the parties can use these
negotiation processes to build on existing levels of trust, be more open with each other, share
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RQ1information of a proprietary nature, etc. Thus, preservation of reputations that produce higher
levels of initial trust may serve as substitutes for more formal alternative control measures
during negotiations, such as confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements, and result in
more equitable and efficient agreements. In contrast, bad-faith bargaining by a party in one
instance can impact its ability to enter into future negotiations with high levels of initial trust.
The results of our analysis suggest that the kind of trust that is associated with these
initial conditions is likely to be complex and multi-dimensional.  This should act as a spur to
researchers to provide a more fine grained picture of these evolutionary pathways (Doz, Olk,
and Ring, 1998). The work of Lane and her colleagues is consistent with our findings, and
provides a basis for further investigations of how factors such as contract regimes or culture
will affect the initial perceptions that parties have regarding each other’s trustworthiness.
We have described the kind of trust that flows from initial conditions as fragile.
Some of the elements contributing to this kind of trust might be the same as those involved in
what Sako describes as contract-based trust. Or they might closely resemble deterrence-based
trust as described by Rousseau et. al. (1998). Superimposing our framework on theirs
provides an even more dynamic view of the way trust evolves over time.
The results of our exploration of the role that partner interaction has in explaining
variance in relational quality provide a solid foundation for further work on how trust might
substitute for more formal controls during the life of an alliance. The ability to build high
levels of trust during initial conditions opens up the opportunity to draw from that reservoir
during the course of implementation. The inherent degree of risk in an exchange will
condition the degrees of freedom open to managers relying on trust (Das and Teng, 1998) as
their relationship evolves.  Our measures of trust in partner interaction indicate that continued
open sharing of information will build higher levels of trust. Learning to cooperate and
“matching” a partner’s investments appears to produce positive results, and these findings are
consistent with the extant literature (Gulati, et. al, 1994; Madhok and Tallman, 1998).
Finally, our findings add support to the need to conduct much more research into the question
of how parties actually use trust as a substitute for more formal organizational controls  as
well as for safeguards in their contracts.
The data on the impact that external events have on levels of trust imply that
managers cannot view exchanges in isolation. Moreover, if they wish to guard against
opportunistic behavior, they need to “monitor” not only their partner but also what other
stakeholders are saying, i.e. they need to pay attention to third party gossip.  Our research did
not permit us to explore differences in the sources of third party gossip as Burt and Knez
(1995) have done.  Managers are in a position to control sources of third party gossip on
which they might rely for sense-making processes, and this appears to be important to their
perceptions of the continued trustworthiness of their partners.
To conclude, we believe that our framework clearly demonstrates that the role of
trust, or better yet, relational quality in inter-organizational alliances is dynamic. Left as an
error term in explaining outcomes in economic exchange, trust hides a multitude of potential
explanations of variance in those outcomes. We have sought to reveal some of the ways in
which trust may affect outcomes, and serve as a substitute for other forms of control of
opportunistic behavior. We believe that our framework also points to ways in which the kinds
of trust that are associated with relational quality might serve as substitutes for controls
embedded in governance mechanisms in general, independently of their relationship to
opportunistic behavior.
19Appendix
Trust formation and decay in dyadic alliances
In the context of our discussion, we have put forward some initial assumptions about what
constitutes the different elements of relational quality, and how each might be subject to
growth or decay as part of the learning process both parties experience in the course of their
relationship.
We define,
RQ  = Relational Quality as the reservoir of trust or goodwill the parties hold
toward each other regarding their expectations of mutual forbearance in
future interactions
RQ0 = f (Initial Conditions), where these include:
1) previous experience with one another
2) partners’ demographics
3) partners’ reputation for fair dealing
4) confidence built throughout negotiation process
RQ1 = RQ0 + ÓPI (0⇒ 1) + XE (0⇒ 1), where
ÓPI (0⇒ 1) = Sum of the experiences from Partner Interaction in the time period
from t=0 to t=1; and
XE (0⇒ 1) = External Events impacting on Relational Quality in the time 
period from t=0 to t=1.
Then,
RQ = ƒ(IC + ÓPI + XE)
Furthermore, the impact of partner interaction on the relationship quality will be
mediated by a number of factors, among which we anticipate the following:
– Number of interactions between the parties and frequency of these interactions;
– Gravity of the interactions, i.e., their potential impact on value outcomes;
– Absolute difference between partner’s actual and expected behavior;
– Nature of partner’s deviation (i.e., sins of commission or omission);
– Intentionality or motivations attributed by one partner to the other;
– Advance warnings and face validity of explanations provided by the partner;
and
– Memory, or leakage over time.
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